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DDI - 5855/82  
16 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1  
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: Results of Meeting, 14 and 15 July 1982,  
with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board  
Subgroup on Verification

1. This memorandum is informational, unless you care to alter the course of action described below. [REDACTED] 25X1

2. The meetings with Mrs. Luce's Verification Subgroup went quite well, I believe. We were originally scheduled for an hour and a half on the 14th, and an additional hour and a half was scheduled over lunch on the 15th. PFIAB members in attendance were:

- John Foster
- Seymour Weiss
- Clare Booth Luce
- Thomas Moorer

PFIAB consultants were:

- Alexander Flax
  - Roland Herbst
- [REDACTED]

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3. A variety of intelligence production and analysis topics were discussed, including arrangements in the Community for intelligence support to arms talks in general, the NIE process, the SS-16 ICBM issue at Plesetsk, and -- at their request -- U.S. monitoring capabilities of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. We discussed the issue of needs for monitoring capabilities beyond NTM, and also discussed the significance of the loss of the Iranian collection site. We provided them with preliminary material on monitoring of INF and START. (S)

4. The give and take between the subgroup members and the CIA/NIC team was stimulating and candid. [REDACTED] and I made a point of offering our good services to the subgroup and its individual members in the future whenever and wherever they desire. Several members -- specifically Dr. Weiss and Dr. Herbst -- both intend to come out to CIA to see [REDACTED] and myself for longer periods of time. [REDACTED]

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5. Of particular note, I believe, was a series of questions on the 15th from Dr. Foster along the following lines: Could we in the Community design a better way of providing intelligence, bearing on compliance questions, to policymakers? [ ] pointed out the difficulty of doing so in an NIE, but he and I agreed that it was possible to do that better -- say, in the memos done by my SALT Monitoring Working Group. Dr. Foster suggested that it would be useful to policymakers, in alerting them to questionable Soviet practices, to lay out the evidence that would support an interpretation that they were in violation of an agreement, as well as the evidence that would support an interpretation that they were not in violation. We agreed that we could lay the evidence out in such a way, if that was desired. This discussion specifically raised two ideas: highlighting an article as a compliance issue and printing some specific bright-color on a document -- say the PDB -- flagging an article as a compliance item. [ ]

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6. The discussion on the SS-16's issue centered on the evidence, and our interpretation, for SS-16 activity at Plesetsk, contrary to the unratified SALT II agreement that SS-16s not be deployed. [ ] cited the treatment of the SS-16 in the recent NIE 11-3/8, and noted further that it was undoubtedly not the U.S. intention, in banning the SS-16, that the Soviets retain the capability to be able to make these missiles ready for use in a war in a matter of hours. Dr. Foster was concerned that the Intelligence Community had not been sufficiently stimulated about the SS-16 problem until the Evans and Novak article in April, 1982. Dr. Foster specifically asked that [ ] and I provide a chronology on the SS-16 ICBM issue, to include the dates when key pieces of information were recognized, the dates when they were published, and an extremely brief view of the content of major documents dealing with the compliance aspect of the SS-16 issue. [ ]

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7. Also on the 15th, Dr. Weiss told me that some "policy makers" had told him and the Subgroup that the Intelligence Community had limited the raising of compliance issues with the USSR. He said he doubted that but wanted a definitive answer. He specifically asked me to provide him a memorandum about the issue of whether the protection of intelligence sources and methods had had an impact on the raising with the USSR of compliance issues. I told Dr. Weiss that we had a list of compliance issues, which had been raised with the USSR in the Standing Consultative Commission. I also said that never has an issue not been raised with the USSR because of sources and methods reasons -- although protection of sources and methods did influence in some cases how our negotiators handled a specific compliance question. I also suggested to Dr. Weiss that he would get a good perspective on this issue from General Ellis, the current SCC Commissioner and from Dr. Buchheim, the previous Commissioner for many years. Dr. Weiss said that he knew both individuals well, and I expect him to contact both of them. [ ]

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8. [ ] and I both understand what is desired and how to get it done. We intend to answer the mail on both issues expeditiously, unless someone desires to change our mind. Subject to your concurrence, since both issues are related to compliance, I will send both responses to the Executive Secretary of PFIAB. [ ]

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
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9. If there is anything more I may do for you here, please call and let me know.



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